• Poster Abstracts at risk). VRE importation pressure was defined to encapsulate the VRE burden at the time of ICU admission (patient-days of VRE exposure on the unit during the preceding 30 days, divided by total patient-days). Multivariable Cox proportional hazards modeling was used, with patients followed until VRE acquisition, death, or for up to 30 days.
Background. Data on the incidence of hospital-wide acquired bloodstream infection (BSI) and the best ways to reduce it are lacking. Our aim was to increase hospital-wide awareness and decrease incidence of hospital-acquired (HA)-BSI through self-investigation.
Methods. Meir Medical Center is a 740-bed hospital. Beginning in January 2016, reports of HA-BSI events were sent daily to the wards with requests to investigate the source of infection, and preventability using a structured questionnaire. The infection control staff gave immediate feedback to the wards regarding their investigation. A summary of the results was sent to all wards and to hospital management quarterly. Interrupted time series analysis was used to compare the monthly rate of HA-BSI before and after the intervention. We estimated the number of cases prevented by the intervention by applying the HA-BSI rate in 2015 to the number of admissions in 2016-2017 and comparing the observed number of cases to the expected if the rate had not changed.
Results. In 2016, 64% of HA-BSI underwent investigation by the wards; this increased to 78% in 2017. As illustrated in the figure, before the intervention, the HA-BSI rate per 1,000 admissions increased by 0.11 per month (not significant P = 0.15). In the first month of the intervention, the HA-BSI rate decreased significantly by 0.43 (P = 0.04, 95% CI: −0.84 to −0.02). The HA-BSI rate continued to decrease (relative to the pre-intervention period) by 0.045 per month (P = 0.05, 95% CI: −0.09 to 0.00). During these 3 years, there was no significant change in the rate of community-acquired BSI (8.46, 8, 88, 8, 58 , P for trend = 0.83) or in the rate of blood cultures drawn. During the intervention, the rate of HA-BSI decreased in both ICU units and in non-ICU wards. The number of HA-BSI caused by Enterobacteriaceae decreased from 170 in 2015 to 116 in 2017. S. aureus decreased from 51 to 30 and Candida from 11 to 0. The most common sources of BSI were urinary tract infection (31.4%) and central line associated BSI (16.4%). All-cause 30-day mortality for patients with HA-BSI was 30%. We estimated that in 2016-2017, 200 cases of HA-BSI and 60 deaths were prevented.
Conclusion. Increase awareness to HA BSI through self-investigation by the wards led to hospital-wide significant reduction in HA-BSI. Background. Norovirus is one of the most common viral pathogens implicated in gastroenteritis outbreaks in community and healthcare settings. The virus' short incubation period and high attack rate allow its rapid spread through inpatient wards to patients (Patients), staff and visitors. Early identification and appropriate implementation of infection prevention and control measures is essential to interrupt transmission.
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Utility of a Multiplex Molecular Gastrointestinal Panel in Rapid Identification and Control of a Norovirus Outbreak in a Pediatric
Methods. The IWK Health Centre is a 250-bed tertiary care Pediatric and Women's hospital serving the Maritime Provinces, Canada. We describe a norovirus outbreak in our Pediatric Medical Unit, a 24-bed, single room ward with individual bathrooms for patients and families. Hospital-acquired norovirus definition: Patients admitted ≥48 hours with lab-confirmed norovirus AND ≥ 1 of: (1) acute onset diarrhea (no noninfectious cause) or (2) ≥2 of: nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, fever, or headache. In 2017 the FilmArray Gastrointestinal (GI) Panel was introduced in the Clinical Microbiology Laboratory as part of a prospective post-implementation study. Since then, stool samples sent for viral, bacterial, or parasitic testing are evaluated by PCR. The panel tests for 22 GI analytes, including five viruses, with a 2-hour turnaround time. Previously, in-house stool viral testing was limited to adeno-and rotavirus antigen. Patient characteristics were collected and analyzed for this study.
Results. Patients 1, 2, and 3 had new onset diarrhea and emesis; Pt 1 on day 0, and Patients 2 and 3 on day 1. Patient 3's parents (likely source) had had diarrhea and emesis on days 3 and 2, and used the ward kitchen. Two care-givers of Patient 2, and 1 medical resident developed diarrhea and emesis over days 0 to 2. The outbreak was declared over on day 7. Patients 1, 2, and 3 all tested positive for norovirus in stool on day 1. On days 2-3, six other patients with diarrhea tested norovirus negative. All symptomatic patients were immediately placed on contact precautions, room/ward cleaning frequency increased and proper hand hygiene was reinforced. Common areas (playroom/kitchen) were closed until the outbreak was over. All patients with loose stool were tested during the outbreak.
Conclusion. FilmArrayGI panel enabled same-day identification of norovirus in this single-ward outbreak and permitted real-time identification of the termination of the outbreak.
Disclosures. All authors: No reported disclosures. October 5, 2018: 12:30 PM Background. We investigated an increase in hospital-acquired invasive fungal infections (HA-IFI) among patients admitted to adjacent hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) and hematologic malignancy (HM) wards in the setting of a large construction project adjacent to the hospital.
Investigation and Mitigation of a Multi-Species Outbreak of Invasive Fungal Infections on Two Oncology Wards
Methods. We defined cases of HA-IFI as HSCT or HM patients who met criteria for probable or proven IFI with suspected inpatient acquisition. We hypothesized that outside construction increased internal particle/spore counts despite preconstruction prevention efforts. The environmental investigation included an evaluation of storage/ distribution of supplies, air handler inspections, air particulate counts, and bioaerosol sampling of airborne fungal spores.
Results. From October 2017 to January 2018, 11 cases of probable/proven HA-IFI occurred (Figure 1) . Infections caused by multiple pathogens (Figure 2 ) ranged from pneumonia and sinusitis to disseminated disease. Bioaerosol sampling and particulate counts were taken from unit corridors and rooms on both wards. Fungal species identified via bioaerosol sampling were primarily Penicillium and Cladosporium species, with rare Aspergillus identified. Geometric mean particulate counts of 1 μm aerodynamic size were reduced by 88% and 75% on the HM and HSCT wards, respectively (Figure 3) . Interventions on these units occurred from January to February 2018 and included: limiting the frequency of outdoor air exchanges on air handler units, reinforcing seals around entrance doors, adjusting room pressurizations to be positive or neutral on HM ward (HSCT ward is already a positive pressure environment), eliminating cardboard associated with supplies, and requiring N95 respirators for HSCT patients when off unit. After implementing these environmental control measures, we have not identified additional cases of HA-IFI on these wards.
